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Opinion of the Court. By William Woolfolk. New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966. Pp. 496. $5.95.
When the Book Review Editor of The Yale Law Journal asked me to
review this book about a Supreme Court Justice, I thought he must be
kidding. Anyone who knows me will tell you I don't know anything
about law.* But then the Editor explained to me about The Yale
Approach. This Supreme Court Justice was both a pilot and a lawyer,
and as far as Yale is concerned the first is at least as important as the
second. Besides, the Book Review Editor promised to help me if 1
got stuck on legal questions. Well, the airline strike was on and I had
plenty of free time, so he talked me into it.
This book is the story of an ex-fighter pilot, Paul Lincoln Lowe,
who rises from the governorship of Nebraska to an active and influ-
ential role on the Supreme Court of the United States. On his way
to the Court Lowe flies in and out of Burma several times, pauses for
a few love affairs, and finally leads a fight to save the waters of the
South Platte for Nebraska. This last battle is still raging when Lowe
is appointed to the Coudrt, and he considers staying in the provinces
to finish the job. But after a talk with his wife, by whose standards
"all greatness could be measured as social prestige" (and whom he
will shortly divorce), he accepts the appointment.
The oath taking ceremony in the Justices' Conference room, and
in the presence of Justice Edmunson whom Lowe had previously
served as law clerk, naturally makes a big impression on Lowe. As
he looks around the conference table he thinks, "Felix Frankfurter
had sat here." (I called the Book Review Editor to ask about the sig-
nificance of this reaction, but he just seemed to go to pieces.)
Lowe is not one to wait for the Court to convene to show what
kind of judge he will be. Even before the Senate hearings on his
nomination, he gives up all other forms of reading so that he can
"read law." And at his first session, even before the arguments begin,
he quickly calculates that the time given in open court to admitting
* The reviewer served in the United States Army Air Forces during World War I.
Since then he has held a bewildering succession of jobs and is currently flying out of
Cambridge, Mass.-Ed.
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attorneys to practice would consume three weeks of Court time per
year. (It seems that the Harvard Law Review had recently proved
that the Court didn't have enough time to do its work.)
Nonetheless, the Court seems to be a jolly place. When Lowe gets
there, the Court has before it a case involving the legality of a Civil
Service Commission hearing in which a government employee had
been discharged on a finding of homosexuality based solely on affi-
davits, with no chance to cross-examine his accusers. Right off, one of
the other Justices, advises him that everyone-Justices, secretaries,
clerks and guards-have money in an office pool on whether Lowe will
vote with Justice Edmunson or with Justice Shuler on the case.
It seems that Edmunson and Shuler are leaders of opposing factions
on the Court. This Shuler is an interesting character, and pretty sharp.
In the conference consideration of the Civil Service case he right
away points out that the employee had not requested cross-examina-
tion at the time of the hearing, but only as an afterthought sometime
later after he hired a lawyer, and that even if he had requested it
earlier the Commission couldn't have granted it because it had no
subpoena power. Shuler is, we are told later, "a brilliant tactician,"
with a "thin voice," who objects to dissenting opinions on denials of
petitions for rehearing as unnecessary advertisement of the Court's
disagreements, who thinks the Court is deciding a lot of things it has
no power to decide, and "whose reputation for harassing lawyers was
legendary." (When the Book Review Editor read this he said, "What
do you mean, Frankfurter had been there? He's still therel")
Edmunson, leader of the liberal coalition, is a very different sort.
He "succeeded in reconciling law and justice" and "searched for
truths on the mountaintops and returned with commandments that
benefited and-protected those who lived on common ground." In the
Civil Service case he brushes aside Shuler's nice legal points with the
observation that, "We cannot tie our constitutional guarantees to a
calendar or -count them lost by a clock." On other occasions he advises
Lowe that, "What we have to do is think through to the principles
the Constitution stands for, lay them down alongside the present prob-
lem, and judge what should be done," and that iwhen the Constitution
says "Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech," it
"tmeans no law." (I thought this last statement was a pretty good clue
about Edmunson, but when the Book Review Editor read this para-
graph he groaned, "My God, Owen J. Roberts is still there too.")
Anyway, Lowe votes with Edmunson on the Civil Service case and
on everything else that comes up while Edmunson is there. But that
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isn't for long. Within two years Edmunson, an old man, is no longer
capable of carrying his share of the load and the question is what is
to be done about it. It seems that if he won't resign (he finally does)
he can be removed by unanimous consent of the other Justices. (I
hadn't known this, before, and neither, when I asked him, had the
Book Review Editor. I guess my friend from the iNew Yorh Times is
right-it's Harvard where they really teach the law.)
There are many other things to be learned from this book about
how the Court and the Justices operate. For instance, when Lowe is
assigned his first opinion-on the constitutionality of broadcasting
music and commercials on a municipal bus-he has an awful time
getting it written. He talks to his former law partner about it, tells
him that Edmunson thinks the broadcasting should be invalidated as
an invasion of privacy, but is not satisfied with the partner's advice
that he write the opinion in accordance with Edmunson's views. Then
he discusses it with the newspaper woman he will later marry and tells
her that Shuler doesn't believe the Constitution forbids the broad-
casting. She has a "practically visceral" reaction against such broad-
casting and he finally writes an opinion outlawing it which is an
"auspicious debut." (This lady, by the way, is a big help to Lowe in
his work because she gets inspirational reactions "in the pit of her
stomach." For instance, when he is wrestling with the constitutionality
of a law forfeiting the citizenship of a naturalized citizen who went
abroad to evade military service, he can't get past Shuler's argument
that this is a proper exercise of the power of Congress to wage war.
But when he puts the problem, and Shuler's position on it, to her,
her reaction is that "It does seem to be just another way of punishing
him." "Punishmentl" Lowe exclaims, "The right answer to Waldo
Shuler." And the case is promptly disposed of on the ground that
Congress can't deal out punishment without due process of law.)
Probably the best insight on how the Court decides cases comes near
the end of the book. The Edmunson faction, its leader ill, is begin-
ning to lose ground. Justice Merriam, who has given it the crucial
fifth vote, succumbs to Justice Shuler's argument that a school board
can fire a Communist teacher because, while the Constitution guar-
antees the teacher's right to think and believe what he pleases, it does
not guarantee his right to be a teacher. ("See?" said the Book Review
Editor.)
Now the Court has before it the question of the constitutionality of
the death sentence in a rape case. The defendant is represented by
Lowe's former law partner and, on Lowe's advice, the lawyer has ar-
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gued that imposition of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In conference
the Court divides four ways. Justice Shuler and three others would
uphold the death sentence. Edmunson, Lowe and one other are pre-
pared to hold all capital punishment unconstitutional. The Chief Jus-
tice is willing to hold it unconstitutional in a rape case. Justice Mer-
riam refuses to vote. After the conference, Lowe goes to Merriam and
urges him at least to vote with the Chief Justice so that Edmunson
can "leave us on a note of triumph." Merriam is finally persuaded,
observing in admiration to Lowe that, "you may turn out to be a
match for that fox Waldo Shuler." And Lowe writes a concurring
opinion for the complete outlawing of the dealth penalty which, in
his former partner's judgment, is "one of the landmark opinions."
The book concludes shortly after the resignation of Edmunson and
near the end of Lowe's second term on the Court. But by now Lowe
has charted his course. He has turned down the President's proposal
to make him a "superambassador" to the world at large, despite the
advice of a newspaper publisher friend that such a job is "the way
up the ladder for any ambitious man." He has decided that he will
stay on the Court, "which [is] becoming a battlefield where a part
of the war for men's minds [is] being fought." He has decided also
that Shuler's "vast knowledge," "divorced from a love of justice, re-
semble[s] cleverness more than wisdom." As we leave him he is reflect-
ing upon a line from Edmunson's letter of resignation: "Everything
we know is in process from one state to another and there is no intrin-
sic enduring-value except the search for what is true."
This is a great book. Anyone who wants to find out how the Supreme
Court really works should read it. I am grateful now to the Book
Review Editor who is responsible for my reading it. But I don't be-
lieve he was of much help to me in writing this review.
VERN COUNTRYMAN
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The Rand Corporation. By R. L. R. Smith. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1966. $7.95.
This book might have been written by a RAND employee.' In fact
it practically was. Begun while Mr. Smith was working for the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, it was assisted by a summer at RAND as
a consultant and six months' employment at RAND after the manu-
script was accepted as a Harvard dissertation but before it was com-
pleted as a finished book. After three months' leave of absence to polish
his work, Mr. Smith returned to RAND where he is now a full-time
employee.
All this is explained in the introduction of the book. The reader is
not warned, however, that Mr. Smith's thesis adviser, Dean Don K.
Price of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration, is a
member of RAND's Board of Trustees-unless he happens to pick out
the name in a later footnote. This is unfortunate; to quote Smith's own
analysis, "RAND trustees have helped blunt attacks on RAND by vir-
tue of the esteem critics have felt toward them personally." And grad-
uate students are considerably more impressionable than critics.
It was Dean Price's Science and Public Policy Seminar at Harvard
that financed Smith's book-polishing three month leave of absence
from RAND, presumably as a kind of fig leaf against the criticism here
aired. (As Smith puts it in his book in another connection: "In Gov-
ernment, avoiding the appearance of evil is often as important as avoid-
ing the evil itself." An examination of the differences between the dis-
sertation and the published book reveals that Smith became less shrill
in attacking RAND's critics but that there was no evident softening
of remarks about RAND.)
The upshot of all this is a totally friendly examination of RAND
right down to a notion of Dean Price's ("federation by contract") that
is friendly toward all RANDs. Virtually every aspect of RAND is de-
fended in general if sometimes criticized mildly and constructively. (Its
status) Rand is "probably unique among the advisory organizations
in the range, depth, and general quality of its professional staff." (Its
raison d'etre) "Policy choices... have become so complex... that no
sensible policy maker can operate without extensive research and ana-
lytical aids." (Its staffing) "A wide variety of professional skills is indis-
pensible....." (Its hierarchical location) "...utilization of expert ad-
1 RAND, a non-profit research organization historically devoted to Air Force problems,
has long been the most widely discussed of American "think tanks."
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vice in the behavioral sciences will be positively influenced by location
of the advisor outside the organization of whose procedures or policies
he is suggesting innovation." (Its concept) "It is perhaps not too much
to say that the relationship between RAND and the Air Force here
presents something of a paradigm for a mutually beneficial sponsor-
advisor arrangement." (Its independence) "Rand studies are the prod-
ucts of individuals, and reflect the variety of outlooks characteristic of
a group of diverse talents." And, finally following Price, "Used prop-
erly, the advisory institution like RAND can contribute to sensible
policy decisions and can help to maintain the dynamism of America's
pluralist governing system."
Nevertheless, the book fully exposes to a careful reader the timidity
of RAND; thus:
In a period of extreme external pressure, for example, it is not
difficult to imagine that RAND management might attempt to
control the publication by RAND researchers of unclassified
articles in the open literature or seek to regulate closely the re-
search staff's freedom to give speeches to academic, industrial and
other non-RAND audiences.
Smith further testifies to "some informal feeling" that in recent years
"management has gone about as far as it can legitimately go in over-
seeing the research staff's external contracts.'"IAgain, Smith explains RAND's fear of answering Congressional in-
quiries for information:
The possibility of "end runs" around an executive sponsor to
,Congress could make for intricate and troublesome problems in
the sponsor-advisor relationship. RAND is acutely, perhaps overly,
conscious of the dangers of this tactic; it has strived to avoid any
congressional contacts either at the staff or management level that
would lessen sponsor confidence in the organization. (Emphasis
added.)
How tame can you get?
RAND apologists always stress the importance of caution in dealing
with the Air Force-especially in the past when RAND was weak. But
it is common knowledge that RAND's caution has grown with its in-
fluence. Buried in a footnote, Smith says,
... it seems to be true that in recent years RAND publications
have been subjected to more rigorous pre-publication criticism
and review before being released to the client or public.
Evidently, RAND solicitude for its client's confidence has not been the
product of weakness only.
Management justified its behavior, in part, by noting that the Air
Force gave RAND better working conditions, "continuity of support,"
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spared it "brochuremanship," and made less difficult "scheduling work.
assigning personnel to specific projects and meeting deadlines." To ad-
vise at levels higher than the Air Force would: draw RAND "inevita-
bly closer to the center of defense policy making"; probably require
"fundamental changes in the organization's character"; and raise "dif-
Lficulties in gaining access to sensitive information." It sounds like a
woman kept by a suspicious old man explaining why she doesn't think
it worth while trying for a more attractive lover and why, most cer-
tainly, she has no intention of going back on the street.
The fact is that RAND's association with the Air Force has been one
of preference, not tactics-the preference of its leadership. Collbohm,
who was President from the start until early this year told the Holi-
field :Committee in 1962 that he was against building up a diversified
operation and that the Air Force had started "right out" with a "phi-
losophy and policy as to how to handle the type of an organization that
RAND is, that is practically perfect." He thought it would be "very,
very undesirable" for the country as a whole, if this relationship should
be changed.
This was totally unnecessary. Surely after 1960, at least, RAND did
not have to fear Air Force budget cuts; the head of their economics
department, Charles Hitch, had become Comptroller of the Defense
Department. McNamara himself knew immediately, through Hitch
and others, how important RAND was and could be. From that 'time,
surely, RAND management was revealed to be more than cautious but
to have a loyalty to the Air Force that was not directly 'tansferable to
-the Defense Department as a whole, or to the nation itself.
More important, partly because it has served the nation's interest
,only through the Air Force's interest, RAND has committed the -im-
portant sin of thinking small. Notwithstanding all the drama of se-
crecy, war, generals, and cross-country plane trips, most RAND -papers
are not consonant with what should have been its high purpose of
shaping national defense policy in gross and important ways. Groups
devoted themselves to Aerodynamics, Fluid Mechanics, Applied Me-
chanics, Information Processing, Electronics, Guidance and Control,
Human Engineering, Applied Mathematics, Meterology, Navigation,
and Nuclear Physics. In most of these cases the subject would not have
been studied so intensively had RAND been attached to either of the
other two services; this reveals the particularity of RAND's perspective.
There were never more than a substantial minority of RANDites con-
sidering either grand strategy, or its important elements (such as gen-
eral systems analysis of defense problems). As has been stated often
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enough, RAND spent far more time worrying about aerial refueling
of bombers than about what their targets ought to be. Their thinking
was far too often operational rather than strategic.
Smith mirrors RAND management in failing to recognize the rela-
tive bankruptcy of the policy of working from within. In so doing,
both continue to parrot the standard RAND list of accomplishments
which starts with intangibles, mentions dynamic programming and
ends with Wohlstetter's strategic basing study. But obviously the cen-
tral achievement of RAND was to supply Secretary McNamara with the
men, the intellectual authority and confidence, and the analytical tools
with which to remake Pentagon planning. Compared to supplying
McNamara with his lieutenants and tools, RAND research, in and of
itself, was very unimportant indeed. It turned out to be better, as far
as RAND and the Air Force was concerned, to "beat em" rather than
"join em." It was the end-run that succeeded big. From the pinnacle
of higher authority, idea after idea was then forced upon services by
former RANDites-ideas that would otherwise have been ignored de-
spite years of the most sympathetic briefings from the most friendly of
supporters. More important, the services themselves were also forced to
go about their own business in a more sensible way. They had to
.change their own reports and style.
Obviously, "the name of the game" in defense is to offer one's advice
at the highest possible effective level. Consider the nineteen fifties'
"bases" study which noticed that western bases near the Soviet Union
for the purpose of quick bomber attack were also near the Soviet
Union from the point of view of Soviet surprise attack. To persuade
the Air Force that its bombers might become vulnerable required what
Smith calls a "saturation" campaign of briefings, Ad Hoc Air Force
committees, reviews, interactions with on-going Air Force feuds over
bomber procurement, pockets of resistance and all the rest. There is
no cure for this sort of nonsense except authority at the top and
RAND should have known it.
RAND's relations with the Air Force are now deteriorating under
the impact of RAND interest in diversification. ("RAND and the Air
Force find themselves in something of the position of an older married
couple with the honeymoon over-yet without sufficient cause to con-
sider a separation.") Only 70%o of RAND work is now Air Force fi-
nanced. The Air Force seeing RAND develop "an intimate advisory
relationship" with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is having
"second thoughts" about its "confidential lawyer-client tie" with
RAND. Some Air Force officers are said to be more "circumspect" in
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dealing with RAND, angry at RANDites who have been too zealous
in selling their research to others, and wondering if they should con-
tinue to contribute a lion's share of RAND funds. Meanwhile,
RAND's new President, Henry Rowen, is said to have been chosen for
his ability to lead RAND into new directions including some as far
outside defense problems as poverty and crime.
Perhaps RAND has a future consonant with its hopes and self-
respect; perhaps not. But its own image of its past, faithfully repro-
duced in this book, is entirely too complacent. If there were indeed only
one RAND, it had a responsibility to spend more of its time on the
real issues and to fight for them not only in, but out of, the Air Force.
Perhaps in the absence of the McNamara revolution, we might have
considered RAND methods the only ones and their success the best
possible. With it, however, one wonders if RAND circumscribed un-
necessarily its goals and hopes and learned too easily to accommodate
those it would influence.
JEREMY J. STONEj
The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688. By John B. Kenyon.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Pp. 523.
$4.95.
The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart Eng-
land. By Clayton Roberts. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1966. Pp. 466. $13.50.
The constitutional history of England in the seventeenth century is
characteristically written in terms of revolutionary conflict. The Res-
toration era is a formless interlude and the events of 1688-89 a neces-
sary epilogue. S. R. Gardiner is largely responsible for the emphasis on
revolution and by default for the comparative neglect of the latter por-
tion of the period. Emancipation from his grand conception of the
Puritan Revolution has proceeded fitfully, while the masterful narra-
tive completed by Firth and supplemented by his own classical collec-
tion of documents has furnished an unrivaled groundwork for all sub-
sequent inquiry. No similar basic pattern exists for the reign of Charles
II, and neither Macaulay nor Trevelyan ever dominated serious schol-
t Assistant Professor of Mathematics, Pomona College. A.B. 1957, Sarthmorc; Ph.D.
1960, Stanford University.
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arship on the last Stuart reigns as Gardiner did that on the first two
and the Interregnum.
Two new titles, issued almost simultaneously by Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, add to a growing list of works which reject, in part or in
whole, the themes of Gardiner and his followers. They are Professor
J. P. Kenyon's The Stuart Constitution and Professor Clayton Roberts'
The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart England. Both em-
phasize fundamentally secular issues and evolutionary changes. Both
relate the events of -the first decades to later developments. Professor
Roberts devotes two-thirds of his pages to the years after 1660.
Professor Kenyon's book is a collection of documents with an intro-
duction and commentaries. It is a companion to the volumes of G. R.
Elton and E. N. Williams entitled respectively The Tudor Constitu-
tion and The Eighteenth Century Constitution. He has chosen his
documents admirably and thereby produced a volume which will place
students of the period in his debt. More important is the historical
analysis the documents are designed to illuminate.
The title may have been demanded in the interests of symmetry
within the series. Professor Kenyon takes it seriously. That is to say,
he makes no concessions to the traditional view of the seventeenth cen-
tury as an era of constitutional collapse in which conflicting versions of
what the constitution should be were refined into a new consensus
only after civil strife had been consummated in revolution.' There was
no revolution and there was consistent agreement on constitutional
fundamentals. Most Englishmen whose opinion was worth consulting
would have agreed in 1610 or in 1690. The "ancient government,"
which alone they would have supported, was a monarchy buttressed
uniquely by the English law.2 Its functions were to maintain order, to
1. Professor Roberts occasionally employs the idiom of revolution. See, e.g., CLAYrON
ROBERTS, THE GRow'r 'OF REsPONsLE GoVERNMENT IN STUART ENGLAND 75, 118 (1906)
[hereinafter cited as ROBERTS]. But he is manifestly not taking about Gardiner's "Puritan
Revolution." Given the -prevalence of the idiom, Professor Kenyon may be overly san.
guine 'about the demise of the Gardiner school. See JOHN P. KENYON, THE STU-ART CON-
sTITUTION (1966) [hereinafter cited as KENYON]. He quite unfairly singles out one recent
title as evidence of lingering traces of outmoded views. The book in question, W. B.
MrrcEtLL, THE Risa OF -THE RFVOLUTONARY PARTY IN THE ENGLIS HousE oF COMMONS,
1603-1629, merits criticism on other grounds. If titles are in question, to say nothing of
underlying.assumptions, there are more :worthy targets. A revolutionary party could exist,
though it never succeeded in bringing off a revolution. But cf. the following representa-
tive list- W. HAL..R, LIBERTY AND REFORMATION IN THE PURITAN REVOLUTION (1955): P.
HARDACRE, THE ROYALISTS DURING THE PURITAN REvOLUTION (1956); C. HILL, TiE CEN-
TURY OF REVOLUTION (1961); C. HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION
(1964); V. PEAu,, LONDON AND THE OUTREAK OF THE PURITAN REVoruTION (1961); H.
TREvOR-ROPER, SCOTLAND AND THE PURITAN REvOLuTION (1963). Gardiner is by no means
to be left to the historians of historiography.
2. Professor Kenyon calls the opponents of monarchy in the early seventeenth century
"for the most part sturdy reactionaries."
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be respectful of rights and to safeguard the nation from foreign injury
or assault. Rulers were expected to be prudent, efficient, well advised,
and wary of abuse of power. No substantial segment of the governing
classes at the beginning of the century or at its end desired to overthrow
the established order. There was equally little enthusiasm for signifi-
cant changes in structure or for admission of new social classes to a share
in the exercise of power. Radical notions appealed only to a few ex-
tremists like Eliot or to noisy religious minorities. The confusions of
the Civil War created the opportunity for the articulation of repub-
lican and wildly democratic views. Ultra-absolutist views made their
appearance as well. None of them took a firm hold, nor did they gain
the same hearing in the upheaval of 1688. There were fewer advocates
of truly radical positions in 1689 than in 1649 or 1629. To speak of
revolution in such a context is to indulge an anachronism.
The Civil War, moreover, was not caused by zeal for religious re-
form. It was engendered primarily out of political conflicts, and "in
the sphere of practical politics the disagreement essentially lay in how
to operate a constitution of whose nature few had any doubts."3 The
most persistent problem concerned religion but not Puritan Reforma-
tion. On the contrary, it was the menace of Catholicism and the Coun-
ter-Reformation. The Stuarts could not be permitted the free exercise
of traditional royal initiative in foreign affairs because they could not
be trusted to support European Protestantism against Catholic threats.
Inded, there could be no assurance that they would not divert English
resources to the uses of France, Spain or the Empire. At home the
prospect that a court-connected ecclesiastical hierarchy might subvert
the church by infiltration was no less terrifying. Until the accession of
William and Mary, the Stuarts never succeeded in allaying the suspi-
don that they or their intimates designed a return to Rome led by an
ardently pro-Catholic episcopate.4 The King, therefore, must not have
free access to the habiliments of war; his diplomacy must be carefully
scrutinized and the clerical establishment must be policedL
No direct frontal attack on royal authority was ever launched to
realize these aims. Men quarreled not with royalty but with abuses.
Persuaded that Charles I would return to the practices to which they
objected as soon as he felt free to do so, the most militant of his oppo-
nents at length chose to fight against the King although not against
kingship. They continued to try to devise means to control the ruler,
3. KENYON 11.
4. Id. at 2, 3, 89, 190.
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not to supersede him. In the meantime, they could not permit him to
command the militia. Mounting hostility to papist innovations failed
to find expression in reform legislation until war forced the most
staunch defenders of the status quo to withdraw from parliament in
defense of the King. Thus, the execution of Charles in 1649 marked
the fulfillment of no revolutionary program either religious or consti-
tutional. Even the governmental experiments of the Interregnum were
notable for their restatement of the old ideal of a supreme magistrate
administering government with the assistance of a new version of the
privy council.5 More remarkable was the composition of Cromwell's
parliaments. The assembly nominated by the God-fearing congrega-
tions, known to posterity as the Barebones Parliament "contained a
majority of 'normal' parliamentary gentry" who were more fearful of
radical changes than they were ambitious to hold their places. There
was an unusually high proportion of country gentry in the next parlia-
ment, a body so obstreperous that Cromwell felt forced to dissolve it
before it had sat for the five full months stipulated in the Instrument
of Government.0
The section of Professor Kenyon's book covering the period from the
return of Charles II through the Revolution of 1688 is entitled "The
Constitution Restored." The troublesome problems were the old ones:
Catholicism, royal foreign policy and finance. Though all contributed
to the removal of James II, the first was of paramount importance.
That cause of controversy, at least, was soon to be laid to rest. The
stubborn Catholicism of the Old Pretender destroyed any prospect of
his succession in 1714 despite Queen Anne's family loyalties and her
distaste for the House of Hanover. She would only countenance a
Protestant on the throne. The Catholic threat ceased to be a political
issue. What else was determined by the events of 1688-89 is less ob-
vious.
Professor Kenyon employs a well chosen and strategically placed
quotation from Halifax as a reminder that continuity and change are
the essential ingredients of the constitution. "Without suiting itself to
differing times and circumstances it could not live." 7 That basic as-
sumptions about the nature and function of government in the Stuart
age were similar to those prevalent in earlier centuries does not imply
a static constitution. Growth and adaptation were constant. Because of
5. Cf. The Instrument of Government, 1653, and The Humble Petition and Advice,
1657. KENYON 342, 350.
6. KENYON 333, 334, 343.
7. Id. at 359.
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the severity of political controversy in the seventeenth century the pro-
cess of change was often turbulent; and continuity was violently rup-
tured by complete collapse during the Civil War and the Interregnum.
The old system was so skillfully patched together at the Restoration,
however, as to create the illusion that the constitution had merely been
held in abeyance for nearly two decades.8 The legislation approved by
Charles I retained its force. That to which he had never consented,
including the removal of the militia from royal control, was expunged
from the statute book and insofar as possible from memory. It is incon-
ceivable that the events of the most dramatically exciting years in En-
gland's history should have left no lasting imprint whatever on the
constitution. The indelible traces were as slight as the deliberate efforts
of men could make them.
The legislation of 1641 had stripped away the instruments through
which Charles I was held to have abused his prerogative. It had abol-
ished prerogative courts, especially Star Chamber and High Commis-
sion.9 It had assured triennial meetings of parliament. It had abolished
practices for supplementing royal revenue by revival and extension of
ancient devices. Royal command over foreign affairs and over the mili-
tary forces of the kingdom were unaffected. When Charles II and
James II gave cause for a revival of the old fears of alliance with, or
subservience to, continental Catholicism the old sources of conflict were
starkly exhibited again. With James driven from the throne and the
leaders of the nation more free than they had been for forty years to
define the terms under which monarchy should operate, no specific
limitation was placed on the most cherished prerogative rights. The
attack upon the King's supremacy in dangerous areas was always fur-
tive. His military powers were curtailed by rigorous fiscal policy.10 The
unique initiative in foreign policy was wrested from him by a long se-
ties of political maneuvers evading any direct challenge to his position.
This is an impressive case, put by no one heretofore so bluntly or
so concisely as by Professor Kenyon. It may be objected that it gives
inadequate recognition to the vastly altered relationship of crown and
parliament; that is to say, King and Commons, by 1714. The answer is,
of course, that the shift was the effect of the process of change operat-
ing through an entire century. It was the fulfillment of no grand de-
8. Id. at 192.
9. It has long been understood that these courts were not merely, or even primarily,
instruments of oppression. Professor Kenyon calls attention to their solid services as well
as to reasons for unpopularity. Id. at 117, 176.
10. Id. at 3.
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sign. It was the end result of a variety of responses to a host of prob-
lems interacting in a fashion which no one could have designed. The
one overwhelming requirement was for unity in a government whose
disparate elements had been permitted to get so badly out of hand as
to work at cross purposes with one another. "The natural bent of
European government [in the seventeenth century] was toward enlight-
ened despotism and centralization, which involved the sacrifice of the
medieval estates or representative assemblies." The parliament at West-
minster, says Professor Kenyon, may well have appeared to be follow-
ing its counter-parts in France, Spain and Brandenburg into oblivion.
It might in fact have done so had the Stuarts possessed "a paid bureau-
cracy in the provinces and a standing army."" Perhaps the ghost of
Gardiner lurks behind his speculation. Parliaments were not inevitable
opponents to royal centralism. Wentworth in Ireland and Lauderdale
in Scotland learned how to make them the instruments of authority,
as Professor Kenyon recognizes. The important point, however, is the
unity of the government. It was achieved in England in the form of a
King who worked perforce in accord with the leaders of parliament
rather than in the form of a parliament which worked perforce in
accord with the King. It is hard to imagine that it could have been
otherwise.
I am content to agree with Professor Kenyon that the Puritan Revo-
lution is a creation of historians, not a fact 'of history.12 On the other
hand, the breakdown of the 1640's was much more than a political
failure. It is not to be explained primarily in terms of fear of Catholics
or suspicion about foreign policy. The conflicts and dissension in and
out of parliament indicated what the events of 1641 and 1642 were to
prove: that there was no adequate constitution to provide the stable
framework for mediation of political, religious, economic and other
conflicts without resort to violence. The Civil War cannot be attrib-
uted simply either to the folly of Charles I or the ambition of his ene-
mies. The job of patching the old system together, accomplished in
1660, was in many ways remarkable. But it left vital sources of tension
unresolved. The threat of another dissolution was, therefore, never
really removed until after 1714, although the memory of the Civil War
was a powerful deterrent to excess. Some of the principal causes of
conflict were settled in the early years of the Restoration and progress
11. Yd. at 1. This is unlikely. There is no evidence that the Royalist program involved
a permanent destruction of parliaments. Charles I, and certainly Strafford, looked forward
to a time when they would be useful.
12. Cf. Pr=R LAs=m-r, THE WoRLD WE HAVE LoSr 158-62 (1965).
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toward stability was rapid after 1689. Much as I admire Professor
Kenyon's book, the authentic Stuart Constitution remains as elusive to
me as the authentic Puritan Revolution.
Professor Roberts is concerned with a more limited theme, though
it has broad implications for the whole history of the constitution. His
title might be rephrased "The Rise and Decline of Impeachment," for
this is, in effect, the story he tells in detail. He writes, too, of the de-
velopment of mastery in the arts of parliamentary management, but
for the most part his bulky volume is concerned with the fashion in
which majorities in Commons in the seventeenth century brought to
book royal ministers who displeased them. His epoch begins with the
refusal of James I in 16 10 to accede to a parliamentary request to at-
tack his ministers. It doses in 1717 when the Earl of Oxford's trial
demonstrated that impeachments were "unnecessary because the pur-
pose for which they had been voted in the past-to make ministers
responsive to the will of Parliament-had been achieved."13 The par-
enthetical phrase is crucial, for though Professor Roberts also judges
impeachments to have become obsolete and unjustifiable by 1715, ver-
dicts on both obsolescence and justification hinge upon purposive use.
The history of impeachment is dearly outlined. First employed
under the Stuarts to punish corruption, it shortly served as an instru-
ment for assault upon ministers whose recklessness or design threat-
ened the.stability of the realm and the well-being of its most influential
citizens. Frustration hy Kings or Lords did not destroy the value of
precedents. The great enemies of the Caroline Commons fell by other
means; Buckingham to the assassin's knife and Strafford and Laud by
acts. of attainder. If impeachment failed to curb absolutism it became
under Charles II effective in partisan conflict. The first Duke of Buck-
ingham had engineered the impeachment of the Earl of Middlesex,
only to have the implement he had employed turned furiously against
him. His son headed the faction. which brought about the impeach-
ment of Lord Chancellor Clarendon. The enemies of the first Duke
were presuaded that they were delivering the nation from a tyrant.
The collaborators of the second Duke knew the prerequisites of the
fallen minister and that vindictiveness assured accession to the posi-
tion. Their success encouraged imitation.
The chief sufferer was. the crown. Charles I and his father had con-
tended that they,, of right, should be arbiters not merely of the efficacy
and wisdom of the acts. of their servants, but of their legality as well.
13. RoamTs 413.
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George I confessed his inability to protect from the hostility of parlia-
mentary majorities those ministers who had committed no offense what-
ever except to assist in the execution or administration of governmental
policy. He may have been indulging a not unreasonable petulance
when he described his ministers as being responsible to the nation. But
he was quite accurate in saying that he could not protect them. Doc-
trines that seemed outrageous to Strafford and a majority of the Lords
in 1641 were now accepted without question. By 1715 it had become
clear that the King could not save his servants from parliamentary at-
tack, either by royal pardon or by assumption of personal responsibility
for policy and its execution. No more could royal servants find security
in the anonymity of collective conciliar responsibility. The crown's
freedom of action and its capacity to command allegiance had been
substantially curtailed.
If no Stuart ruler surrendered authority without struggle, long run
defeat at the hands of the politicians was inevitable. Impeachment,
transformed from the buckler of liberty into the tool of faction, became
discredited. In the meantime, however, more subtle political devices
were utilized to maintain limitations on the independent prerogative.
Men refused to serve with others whom they disliked, or to support,
even tacitly, policies of which they disapproved. Their motives were
mixed, but they were inclined to be swayed by prospects for future
position or by ambition to humiliate potential political opponents
rather than by concern for welfare of the state. Rulers, particularly
after the revolution of 1688, preferred official families composed of
men of diverse connections united in a common loyalty to the throne.
They were frustrated by the politicians' insistence on working only
with their friends. Thus royal freedom of choice and command on
allegiance was further weakened, the more so in cases of men or cliques
who possessed great influence with the Commons.
The effects, then, of the great conflicts of the early seventeenth cen-
tury and the somewhat less inspiring political maneuvers of the post-
Restoration era were a substantial circumscription of royal power and
the establishment of ministerial accountability for conduct of public
affairs. But does this constitute a growth of responsible government?
To affirm that men who participated in unwise, unfortunate or un-
popular decisions could be prevented by parliamentary pressure from
continuing to serve the government is not to ascribe to parliament
either a positive role in the formulation of policy or consistent control
over the executors of policy. The question turns on viable definitions
of the concept of responsibility.
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As Professor Roberts phrases it, "I shall use 'responsible government'
to mean all those laws, customs, conventions and practices that serve
to make ministers of the King rather than the King himself responsible
for the acts of government, and that serve to make these ministers ac-
countable to Parliament rather than to the King .... In the thirteenth
century the King assumed responsibility for the actions of government
and the ministers of the King answered to him for their conduct. In
the reign of Queen Victoria ministers of state assumed responsibility
for what the government did, and answered to Parliament for the wis-
dom of it. The history of responsible government is the history of both
these transformations."14
What was the relationship of the one hundred fifteen years follow-
ing the accession of James I to this history? No one would argue that
the process of transformation was in that time completed. Professor
Roberts identifies 1841 as the terminal date. What then? Professor Rob-
ers' rhetorical conclusion is unambiguous: "Given an island secured
by a navy, given a Crown dependent on parliamentary revenues, given
a people impatient of injustice and unhappy at constraint, given a suc-
cession of Kings inept at governing and insensitive to the wishes of
their subjects, and given a race of politicians eager to secure office by
proving that they could govern in the Commons, no other result could
be expected than a struggle for the sceptre that would issue in the tri-
umph of responsible government."15 The crucial conditions presum-
ably were fixed before the House of Hanover moved to England. The
developments of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were
only incidental.
These conclusions may not seem obvious to the student of English
politics in the Hanoverian era or to the student of Anglo-American
institutions who recalls that the seventeenth century left no inescapable
legacy of responsible government in the United States. To almost any-
one living in Robert Walpole's generation it would have been incom-
prehensible that the history of the preceding century had determined
the future in such a way. It must be noted, of course, that men rarely
possess much foresight concerning the long-term effects of their own
acts or those of their immediate forebears. It is important, nonetheless,
that the ministers of George I were still the King's ministers and that
no one whose opinion counted for much thought they should be any-
thing else. Parliament might drive a man from power, but the favor
14. Id. at viii.
15. .Id. at 446.
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of the King was absolutely essential either to, gaining or holding power.
Royal favor might be bestowed for a variety of reasons. Not least
among the talents gratifying to the King would be the capacity to
manage parliament. This implied an awareness of the limits beyond
which the Commons could not be led, as well as a mastery of the arts
of cajolery, deception, jobbery and appeal to prejudice. Mid-eighteenth
century ministers, like Carteret, could perhaps be somewhat cavalier
about the pains taken to, court the Commons. As a general rule, how-
ever, it was prudent, indeed necessary to make certain that no fears of
national betrayal spread through the House. This meant cultivation
and manipulation; it did not mean responsibility. On this point, I am
sure Professor Roberts and I agree. Where we differ is on the question
of the inevitable emergence of responsibility.
It is unfortunate that editorial decision has deprived us of an exten-
sion to the end of the Stuart era of Professor Kenyon's more impersonal
institutional analysis. Exclusion of the reigns of William and Anne is
hardly appropriate to an examination of The Stuart Constitution. He
only remarks that whoever gained by the Revolution of 1688 "it was
not the House of Commons."'1 It may be suspected that he would have
found the essential features of the constitution in 1714 to be what he
defined them as being in 1688. Challenges had been met; threats had
been overcome; adjustments had been made, The old ruling class had
fumbled and fought through to a modus vivendi with which it was
almost entirely contented. Thereafter political controversy, religious
dissent and all manner of competition could reach serious proportions
without threatening the essential tranquility of the state. Some observ-
ers, perhaps mistakenly, could discern the lineaments of an. almost per-
fect balance of power. At any rate, a drive for ultimate monopoly of
all of the machinery of government appeared to be as remote as an
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